Georgia State University College of Law

Reading Room
Georgia Business Court Opinions

2-18-2009

Order on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
(DEBORAH EAVES)
Alice D. Bonner
Superior Court of Fulton County

Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/businesscourt
Institutional Repository Citation
Bonner, Alice D., "Order on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (DEBORAH EAVES)" (2009). Georgia Business Court Opinions.
17.
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/businesscourt/17

This Court Order is brought to you for free and open access by Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia Business Court Opinions
by an authorized administrator of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
DEBORAH EAVES on behalf of herself *
and all others similarly situated
*
*
Plaintiff,
*
v.
*
*
*
EARTHLlNK, INC.
*
*
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 2005-CV-97274
(Business Division 1-AB)

ORDER ON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Counsel appeared before the Court on February 9,2009, to present oral
argument on Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After reviewing the
motions and briefs submitted on this matter, the arguments presented by counsel, and
the pleadings in this case, the Court finds as follows:
Standard

A motion for judgment on the pleadings under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(c) requires that
the Court take all well-pled material allegations by the non-movant as true. A motion for
judgment on the pleadings shall be granted if the averments in the complaint "disclose
with certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts
which could be proved in support of his claim." Cox v. Turner, 268 Ga. App. 305, 305
(2004) (citations omitted). In order to decide a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
the Court may look to the pleadings, as well as to any other exhibits, such as
agreements, attached to the complaint. Gold Creek SL, LLC v. City of Dawsonville, 290
Ga. App. 807, 809 (2008).

Facts
This class action suit involves claims regarding Defendant's practice of charging
early termination fees ("ETFs") to consumers' on-file credit cards. Three subcategories
exist within the Plaintiff Class: (1) those who have cancelled their EarthLink service
and paid an ETF, (2) those who have cancelled their EarthLink service, but refused to
pay an ETF, and (3) those subject to an ETF charge upon cancellation of services.
Defendants bring this Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with regard to the first
identified subcategory of Plaintiffs, those who have cancelled their EarthLink services
and paid an ETF.
Upon the initiation of services, the individual members of the Plaintiff Class and
EarthLink entered into a Service Agreement, which was attached as Exhibit A to the
1

Complaint. The Service Agreement stated that cancellation of the service prior to the
2

initial term of the agreement would result in a $149.95 charge. Additionally, pursuant to
the Service Agreement, customers agreed to keep a current credit card on file with
EarthLink.

3

1. The Plaintiff Class does not dispute that the Service Agreement entered into
between the individual members of the Plaintiff Class and EarthLink is substantially
similar to the form attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint.
2. (4) Cancellation. "If you are dissatisfied with the Service or any related terms,
conditions, rules, policies, guidelines, or practices, your sole remedy is to discontinue
using the Service, cancel your account, and pay any cancellation fees that apply ....
Cancellation of the Service by you before the initial term of the agreement ends will
result in a $149.95 charge."
3. (6) Payment "You are responsible for any charges to your account.. .. Charges are
billed to your credit card or debit card, as applicable, each month for the Service and
any additional usage or services .... You agree to maintain valid and current credit card
information on file with EarthLink at all times."
2

Voluntary Payment Doctrine

EarthLink moves for judgment on the pleadings fees pursuant to the voluntary
payment doctrine on claims by members of the Plaintiff Class who have already paid

the early termination fee. Pursuant to the voluntary payment doctrine, "[p]ayments of .
claims through ignorance of the law or where all the facts are known and there is no
misplaced confidence and no artifice, deception, or fraudulent practice used by the
other party are deemed voluntary and cannot be recovered." O.C.G.A. § 13-1-13. The
Plaintiff Class, as the party seeking to recover payment, bears the burden of
establishing that the voluntary payment doctrine does not apply. Telescripps Cable Co.
v. Welsh, 247 Ga. App. 282 (2001).
Georgia has developed a robust body of case law pertaining to the voluntary
payment doctrine. For example, in Telescripps, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that
voluntary payment of a cable provider's late fee by subscribers who did not know that
the late fee was an unenforceable penalty were made "under ignorance of the law" and
thus not recoverable under the voluntary payment doctrine. Telescripps, 247 Ga. App.
at 285. Additionally, in Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Radiotherapy of Ga., 252 Ga. App.
543 (2001), the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the voluntary payment doctrine
barred the recovery of excessive Medicare payments by the plaintiff insurance company
because the Medicare rules were matters of public record and there was no evidence of
fraud or misplaced confidence. While the situations of application may vary, the law is
clear that "[w]hen money is paid with full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances
upon which it is demanded, or with the means of such knowledge, it cannot be
recovered back ... " Telescripps, 247 Ga. App. at 285.
3

The Plaintiff Class opposes the application of the voluntary payment doctrine in
this case on the grounds that the manner in which the ETF was collected was deceptive
and involuntary. The Plaintiff Class asserts that the ETF charges were not authorized
to be automatically billed to the on-file credit cards because such fees do not qualify as
"charges" or "additional services or usage" under the terms of the Service Agreement.
The Court reads paragraphs 4 and 6 of the Services Agreement as unambiguously
authorizing the ETF charge of $149.95 to be made to the on-file credit card. Thus, the
Court finds that the ETF charges were made with prior knowledge by and authorization
of the individual members of the Plaintiff Class.
Alternatively, the Plaintiff Class distinguishes this case from Telescripps and its
predecessors based upon the automatic manner in which the ETFs were charged to
customers arguing that it is deceptive and involuntary. Unlike previous forms of billing
that required a bill to be sent to a customer who must then affirmatively act to pay the
bill (i.e., provide cash, write a check, provide a credit card number, etc.), the ETF was
charged directly to the credit card on file. Therefore, there was no time for notice to or
action by the customer during the time between when the ETF was billed by EarthLink
and subsequently "paid" by the customers. 4
The Plaintiff Class argues that if the voluntary payment doctrine is applied to bar
recovery of automatic charges to on-file credit cards as presented in this case, then any
fee concocted by EarthLink and charged to customers' credit cards would be

4. Those members of the Plaintiff Class falling in the second subcategory, those who
cancelled their service and refused to pay the ETF, had to take action after the charge
appeared on their credit card bill (Le., contacting the company, charging back the fee
through their credit card, etc.).
4

unrecoverable. Such a case is not before the Court. Here, the Service Agreement
specifically provided for the payment of an ETF as well as the requirement that a credit
card be kept on file. While the exact terms of the service contract in this case are
distinguishable from Telescripps, the principle enunciated in that case-that the
voluntary payment doctrine applies to payments made with knowledge of the facts-is
applicable to and binding on this case.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the claims of the members of the Class who paid
an early termination fee are barred by the voluntary payment doctrine and hereby
GRANTS Judgment on the Pleadings in favor of EarthLink on the claimsof those Class

members.

50 ORDERED this

! 't>

day of ---=-Ce.b-=------_. _ _ _, 2009.

ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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Copies to:
David Worley, Esq.
Page Perry LLC
1040 Crown Pointe Parkway
Suite 1050
Atlanta, GA 30338
(770) 673-0047
Bruce V. Spiva, Esq.
Kathleen Hartnett, Esq.
Spiva & Hartnett LLP
1776 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Suite 600
Washington, D.C. 20036
Steven N. Berk, Esq.
Chavez & Gertler, LLP
th
1225 15 Street, N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
David L. Balser, Esq.
Nathan L. Garroway, Esq.
Tracy Klinger, Esq.
McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP
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